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Outcomes and expectations in dilemmas of trust
Anthony M. Evans∗ Joachim I. Krueger†
Abstract
Rational trust decisions depend on potential outcomes and expectations of reciprocity. In the trust game, outcomes
and expectations correspond to the structural factors of risk and temptation. Two experiments investigated how risk and
temptation influenced information search and final decisions in the trust game. The central finding was that trustors under-
emphasized temptation relative to its effects on the expected value of trust. Instead, trustors made decisions egocentrically,
focusing on potential outcomes. In Experiment 1, information search data revealed that trustors often made decisions
without learning about the payoffs related to temptation. Experiment 2 investigated whether trustors were able to use
temptation to form accurate expectations of reciprocity. Trustors understood, but underestimated, the relationship between
temptation and the probability of reciprocity. Moreover, they did not fully consider expectations in their final trust deci-
sions. Changes in potential outcomes had larger effects on trust than comparable changes in expectations. These results
suggest that levels of trust are too high when the probability of reciprocity is low and too low when that probability is high.
Keywords: trust, reciprocity, social dilemmas, egocentrism.
1 Introduction
Trust plays a critical role in the lives of managers
(Murnighan, 2012), consumers (Hoffman, Novak, & Per-
alta, 1999), and negotiators (Olekalns & Smith, 2005).
The dominant view in economics and psychology is that
acts of trust are based on expectations of reciprocity.
Trustors are thought to form an educated guess about
the other party’s intentions and then respond accordingly
(Binmore, 2007; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Rot-
ter, 1967). Trust, in other words, is treated as a matter of
strategic perspective-taking. However, a body of research
on social cognition suggests that people often lack the will
or the capacity to take the perspective of others (Alicke &
Sedikides, 2010). Considering another person’s point-of-
view requires time and cognitive effort (Lin, Keysar, &
Epley, 2011), and, even when perspective-taking occurs, it
is often inaccurate (Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991).
In this report, we propose that decisions to trust arise
from egocentric reasoning (Evans & Krueger, 2011).
Trustors focus on self-relevant outcomes, that is, on their
potential gains and losses, while neglecting the trustee’s
incentives to reciprocate trust or to betray it (Malho-
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tra, 2004; Snijders & Keren, 1999). We investigate
this idea with process tracing methods that record how
trustors search for information, and examine the accuracy
of trustors’ expectations of reciprocity.
1.1 Defining trust
In a now classic definition, Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and
Camerer (1998, p. 395) proposed that trust is “a psycho-
logical state comprising the intention to accept vulnerabil-
ity based upon an expectation of reciprocity.” This defi-
nition has two key properties. Vulnerability refers to the
possibility of a negative outcome, and the expectation of
reciprocity refers to the trustor’s belief that a negative out-
come can be avoided. These properties correspond to two
distinctive judgments. The trustor needs to identify and
evaluate the potential outcomes of trust, and to estimate
the probabilities of those outcomes occurring.
Most research studies on trust use an experimental
game, which captures the basic dilemma (Camerer, 2003;
Dasgupta, 1988). Two players act in sequence, as illus-
trated in Figure 1. The first player, or trustor, chooses
between keeping the status quo by terminating the game
with the payoffs of P1 and P2, and continuing the game
by placing trust in the second player. This second player is
the trustee, who now has a choice between reciprocity and
betrayal. Reciprocity means that the two players receive
similar payoffs (R1 ≈ R2), whereas betrayal means that
the trustor receives less (S) than the trustee (T ). To repre-
sent the idea that trust adds economic value, the initial act
of trust multiplies the total wealth available to both players
(R1 and R2 are better than P1 and P2, respectively).
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In the trust game, the psychological element of vulner-
ability arises from differences among the trustor’s payoffs
(P1, R1, and S). Snijders and Keren (1999) proposed that
the term “risk” replace the term “vulnerability,” and to use
the ratio of (P1 − S)/(R1 − S) as a quantitative index.
Risk is high when there is much to lose and little to gain
from trusting. The expectation of reciprocity depends on
the trustee’s payoffs. Inasmuch as the payoff of betrayal
(T ) is greater than the payoff of reciprocity (R2), a self-
interested trustee has incentive to defect. This difference
is scaled by the value of the trustee’s largest possible pay-
off (T ). This means that temptation is given by the ratio of
(T −R2)/T .
1 Temptation is large when betrayal produces
a large bonus for the trustee.
2 Trust based on expectations of
reciprocity
A scientific explanation of trust must describe how people
use outcomes and expectations to reach a decision. Game-
theoretic models assume that trustors decide by predicting
trustees’ responses, then comparing the utility of trust with
the status quo (Binmore, 2007). According to orthodox
game theory, trustors realize that trustees have no mone-
tary incentives to reciprocate once they have been trusted.
They will defect for any T > R2. A self-interested trustor
maintains the status quo unless there is a prospect of re-
1Snijders and Keren (1999) defined temptation as (T−R2)/(T−S),
assuming that trustees were averse to harming trustors. We removed S
from our definition to avoid confounding risk and temptation.
peated play, in which case trust and reciprocity may reach
a positive equilibrium (Gintis, 2009). These pessimistic
predictions for one-shot exchanges do not describe real-
world behavior. Experiments around the world show in-
termediate levels of trust and reciprocity, even when there
is no possibility of future interactions (Johnson & Mislin,
2011). These findings suggest that many individuals have
positive expectations of reciprocity. Taking these expec-
tations into account, a modified game-theoretic approach
predicts that trust decisions are based on expected value,
the product of the trustor’s potential outcomes weighted
by the perceived probabilities with which they will occur.
Several influential psychologists have also emphasized
the importance of positive expectations. Writing about
trust in social institutions, Rotter (1967) proposes that ex-
pectations of teachers, politicians, and journalists are in-
tegral to the concept of trust. Yamagishi’s (1986) Gen-
eral Trust Scale defines trust as individual differences in
positive expectations of people in general. Others further
distinguish between the cognitive and affective types of
trust (Chua, Ingram, & Morris, 2008; Johnson-Georges &
Swap, 1982). Cognitive trust consists of the expectation of
the trustee’s competence and reliability, whereas affective
trust is the expectation of benevolence. Both dimensions
characterize the perceptions of the other party.
As this brief review shows, expectations of reciprocity
play a normative role in trust decisions and there is empir-
ical evidence that they matter. Yet, the question remains of
whether individual trustors use information about the pay-
offs available to the trustee to form accurate expectations
of reciprocity, and whether they use these expectations op-
timally when making decisions. In a complex situation
such as a trust-based exchange, there is reason to doubt
that trustors are fully rational. To solve a difficult strategic
decision problem, trustors may take a simplified approach
and neglect to take a full account of the trustee’s perspec-
tive. If so, trustors will make systematic errors of over-
and under-trusting. We test this idea in two experiments.
2.1 Egocentric Trust
Our guiding hypothesis is that the trustors’ own potential
consequences are the primary determinants of their deci-
sions. Consider how risk and expectations are represented
in the trust game. An expectation-based approach assumes
that trust is primarily based on temptation (T−R2)/T . As
temptation increases, the expectation of reciprocity weak-
ens. Yet, research shows that trustors’ decisions are pri-
marily based on the trustor’s own outcomes (Malhotra,
2004; Snijders & Keren, 1999). In previous research, we
manipulated risk and temptation independently and found
that temptation affects trust only when risk is low (Evans
& Krueger, 2011). We now develop the idea that the
trustor’s focus on risk is a specific instance of the gen-
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eral tendency to selectively attend to self-relevant infor-
mation. Across a variety of psychological tasks, peo-
ple perceive the social world through the lens of self-
interest. Some egocentric processes may be motivated by
self-enhancement or self-protection (Alicke & Sedikides,
2010), but often they result from the salience and acces-
sibility of self-knowledge (Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff, &
Decety, 2006; Krueger, 2003). What others know, desire,
or intend, is difficult to infer (Malle, 2004).
We report two experiments to investigate the egocentric
nature of trust decisions. Experiment 1 employs process-
tracing methods to shed light on how trustors search for
relevant information, revealing their priorities. We ask
whether trustors attend to the other player’s incentives
(i.e., temptation) and use this information when making
trust decisions. Experiment 2 investigates the potential
causes of egocentrism. Trustors may neglect temptation
because they do not fully realize its relevance for the prob-
ability of reciprocity, or they understand its importance but
fail to consider it at the moment of decision-making.
3 Experiment 1
To study how people approach dilemmas of trust, we
chose a method that reveals the process of online infor-
mation search. In Experiment 1, we used the Mouselab
software, which records information acquisition as it oc-
curs (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). With Mouselab,
decision problems are presented so that the outcomes of
potential choices are concealed in boxes. To discover an
outcome, participants must drag the mouse over the box of
interest and the software records a sequential log of search
events.
Our key assumption is that trustors are mainly con-
cerned with their own opportunities. They ask, “What’s
in it for me?” It is harder, and perhaps of less immediate
interest, to consider the perspective of the trustee (Alicke,
Dunning, & Krueger, 2005; Alicke & Sedikides, 2010). In
the context of information search, this means that trustors
focus on their own potential gains and losses. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1 is that trustors will focus their attention on
self-relevant information. We tested this hypothesis by ex-
amining omissions, whether trustors access the payoffs as-
sociated with risk and temptation at least once before mak-
ing a final decision.
Experiment 1 also investigated whether risk and temp-
tation were weighted optimally in final decisions. We ex-
amine if focusing on risk (and ignoring temptation) re-
sults in suboptimal behavior. Temptation is only useful in
decision-making insofar as it relates to the expected value
of trust. This calculation is based on the multiplication
of outcomes and probabilities. Temptation is relevant be-
cause of its effect on the probability of reciprocity (Mal-
hotra, 2004; Snijders & Keren, 1999), but the egocentric
approach assumes that trustors do not optimally use this
information.
Previous studies have found that trustors have limited
sensitivity to temptation (Evans & Krueger, 2011; Snijders
& Keren, 1999), but these studies did not estimate the ef-
fect of temptation on expected value. Ignoring temptation
is justifiable if it has little or no bearing on final earnings.
Hypothesis 2 is that trustors underweight the importance
of temptation relative to its effect on expected value. To
test this account, we calculated how trustors responded to
changes in expected value caused by increases in risk and
temptation. Hypothesis 2 states that changes in expected
value through risk will have a stronger effect on behavior
than comparable changes through temptation.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
Undergraduates were recruited from a subject pool main-
tained by the Department of Economics at Brown Univer-
sity. The sample comprised 61 men, 51 women, and two
participants who did not report their gender. Students ma-
joring in economics made up 27.2% of the sample. The re-
maining participants reported diverse academic interests,
including the natural and physical sciences (38.5%), other
social sciences (19.3%), and the humanities (17.5%).
The experiment was conducted in seven sessions, with
12 to 19 participants in each. Participants received a $10
show-up payment and additional earnings based on his
or her choices (another $5–15). Individual sessions took
less than one hour to complete. We collected data for
both roles in the trust game, but this report focuses on the
trustors (N = 57).
3.1.2 Materials
The trust game Participants completed 24 trials of the
trust game. They were randomly partnered for each trial,
and the consequences of other players’ decisions were re-
vealed at the end of the experiment. Participants were
given the role of Player 1 (trustor) or 2 (trustee) by ran-
dom assignment, and they retained that role throughout
the experiment. On each trial, Player 1 needed to make a
choice between IN or OUT (trust or status quo), whereas
Player 2 chose between SHARE or KEEP (reciprocity or
betrayal). Trustees always made a decision regardless of
whether Player 1 chose IN or OUT, but they understood
that their decisions between SHARE and KEEP would be
relevant only if trustors chose IN. Participants were paid
based on the outcomes of all 24 decisions (100 points =
$1.00).
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Payoffs We orthogonally manipulated two factors in the
trust game’s structure, risk and temptation: Risk was the
ratio of the trustor’s cost over benefit, (P1−S)/(R1−S),
with initial levels of .25 (low) and .75 (high). Temptation
was the trustee’s incentive to choose betrayal, (T−R2)/T ,
with three levels: .16 (low), .35 (medium), and .60 (high).
These initial six conditions were selected based on previ-
ous studies of the trust game (Evans & Krueger, 2011). We
further randomized these conditions to create 24 unique
trials: Each of the six conditions was adjusted four times
by randomly generated multipliers ranging from 0.5 to 1.5.
Finally, the six individual payoffs within each of the trials
were randomized by a jitter factor of up to ± 10%. At
the end of this process, there were 24 trials (see Appendix
for the baseline conditions and exact payoffs used in the
experiment).
Information search Four of the seven sessions were as-
signed to the Mouselab condition (Willemsen & Johnson,
2011), where the payoffs of the trust game were concealed
inside boxes. To learn the value of an outcome, partic-
ipants had to drag the mouse over a labeled box. Mov-
ing the mouse outside of a box closed it, but participants
could revisit each box as often as they wished. Mouselab
recorded the order and duration of each payoff viewing.
Participants were not allowed to take notes or to record
information about the payoffs.
In the remaining three sessions, all boxes were open
and all payoffs were visible. The rules of the game, its
visual structure, and the payoff values were identical to
the ones in the Mouselab sessions. We expected no be-
havioral differences between the open- and closed-boxes
conditions. Mouselab was only meant to measure, but not
to alter thinking about the game.
Visual presentation The trust game was presented as
an extended decision tree. We controlled for directional
search biases (i.e., top to bottom or left to right) by ran-
domly varying three presentational features: The horizon-
tal alignment of the trustor’s choices (IN versus OUT); the
horizontal alignment of the trustee’s choices (KEEP ver-
sus SHARE); and the vertical alignment of the players’
payoffs. Figure 2 is a screenshot of the trust game as it was
presented to participants. The three potential outcomes
were consistently labeled (OUT, KEEP, and SHARE) to
reduce noise in information search.
3.1.3 Procedure
Participants read detailed instructions of the rules of the
game, completed a quiz to ensure that they understood
the rules, and responded to 24 trials of the game. Exact
instruction materials are reported in the Appendix. Af-
ter finishing the game, participants completed follow-up
Figure 2: Screenshot of the Mouselab condition.
questions and a battery of psychological instruments that
were not analyzed for this report. To prevent incidental
priming effects, these instruments were always presented
after the trust game.
3.2 Results and discussion
3.2.1 Mouselab and open-boxes conditions
A concern with Mouselab is that it alters the process of
decision-making (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). To see if this
concern was warranted in our study, we compared the ag-
gregate rates of trust and response times (total time elapsed
during the 24 trials of the game) between the Mouselab
and open-boxes conditions. Rates of trust were measured
on a scale from 0 (never trusted) to 1 (always trusted).
Reassuringly, the average rates did not vary across the
Mouselab (M = .34, SE = .041, n = 33) and open-boxes (M
= .31, SE = .043, n = 24) conditions, t(55) = .62, p = .54.
Similarly, there was no significant difference in average
response times between the Mouselab (M = 14.5 seconds
per trial, SE = .94) and open-boxes conditions (M = 12.4,
SE = 1.24), t(55) = 1.36, p = .18. There was no indica-
tion that the Mouselab interface affected trust or response
times. When analyses did not involve variables generated
by Mouselab, we used the combined data from both con-
ditions (N = 57).
Mouselab recorded a sequential log of individual search
events. These records were parsed for the time spent view-
ing each payoff and the order in which payoffs were ac-
cessed). Following convention, search events of duration
< 100 milliseconds were discarded (Willemsen & John-
son, 2011).
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Table 1: Information search omissions in Experiment 1.
Standard errors reported in parentheses; Paired sample t-
tests were conducted with 32 degrees of freedom; * indi-
cates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01.
Self Other t-test r2
Status quo .10 (.045) .28 (.053) 5.11** 0.45
Reciprocity .15 (.048) .24 (.055) 2.25* 0.14
Betrayal .11 (.046) .23 (.055) 3.76** 0.32
3.2.2 Information search
Hypothesis 1 states that trustors focus primarily on self-
relevant information. To investigate information search,
we measured how often trustors fully neglected payoffs
(omissions). Table 1 reports the average rates of omis-
sions for self- and other-relevant payoffs, revealing that
trustors often responded without viewing one or more of
the trustee’s outcomes. This pattern was consistent for
each of the three potential outcomes, but was especially
strong for the status quo. The trustee’s status quo pay-
off (P2) was the most commonly neglected piece of infor-
mation, while the self-relevant status quo payoff (P1) re-
ceived the most attention. The relative neglect of P2 sug-
gests trustors were not primarily motivated to maximize
the equality or efficiency of outcomes.
We also measured the rates at which trustors failed
to search for information related to temptation and risk,
counting the rates at which trustors neglected at least one
relevant payoff for each factor: P1, R1, or S for risk; R2
or T for temptation. The greater number of payoffs asso-
ciated with risk increases the likelihood of an omission oc-
curring, making this is a conservative test of egocentrism.
Still, the rate of temptation omissions (M = .31, SE = .033)
was significantly larger than the rate of risk omissions (M
= .15, SE = .048), t(32) = 2.4, p = .02, r2 = .15. Informa-
tion search data strongly supported the idea that trustors
approached decision-making from an egocentric point of
view. The tendency to ignore information was particularly
striking because there were good reasons to expect few
omissions: decisions were incentivized, the payoffs varied
significantly across trials, and information search required
little effort.
3.2.3 Trust decisions
Hypothesis 2 states that trustors underweight the impor-
tance of temptation relative to its effect on the expected
value of trust. We report three sets of analyses to exam-
ine this possibility: First, we tested the basic effects of
risk and temptation on the rates of trust and reciprocity.
Second, we calculated the effects of risk and temptation
on the expected value of trust. Finally, we weighted risk
and temptation relative to their effects on expected value,
allowing us to directly compare their effects on decisions.
Risk and temptation. The zero-order effects of risk and
temptation on trust and reciprocity decisions were esti-
mated with correlations, using each trial as an observa-
tion, df’s = 22 (see Figure 3 for scatterplots). Trust was
less likely to occur at high levels of risk, r = –.91, p <
.001, and was also less likely to occur at high levels of
temptation, r = –.41, p = .044. The rate of reciprocity was
closely tied to the level of temptation, r = –.81, p < .001,
and weakly correlated with risk, r = .18, p = .41.
At a correlational level, the effect of temptation on trust
was less pronounced than the effect of risk. However, the
preceding correlations did not account for the fact that risk
and temptation may have different effects on the expected
value of trust. The weaker correlation between tempta-
tion and trust may reflect the fact that temptation had less
objective relevance for the expected value of trust deci-
sions, which depends on both outcomes and probabilities.
Hence, the next step was to test the effects of risk and
temptation on the expected value of trust.
Expected value of trust Expected value was based on
the weighted average of the potential outcomes of trust,
R1 and S, using the observed probabilities of reciprocity
and betrayal, p and 1 − p, as weights. We calculated the
difference between this weighted average and the value of
the status quo, P1. To account for the variability in stakes
across trials, this difference was divided by the value of
the status quo payoff, P1, so that the expected value for
each trial was given by [R1 · p + S · (1 − p) − P1]/P1,
where p is the observed probability of reciprocity.
According to this definition, an expected value of 0 in-
dicates that choosing trust, on average, generates the same
payoff as the status quo, P1; an expected value of .5 in-
dicates that choosing trust generates a payoff equal to 1.5
times the status quo; and an expected value of –.5 indi-
cates that trust yields a payoff half the size of the status
quo. The average expected value was slightly negative (M
= –.14, SE = .055), but was positive for 6 out of 24 trials.
The expected value of trust changes with the level of
risk, increasing with R1 and decreasing with S and P1. It
also changes with temptation, through temptation’s effect
on p, the probability of reciprocity. However, the effects of
risk and temptation may not be equal in magnitude. Sim-
ple linear regressions measured the actual effects of risk
and temptation. The expected value of trust significantly
decreased at higher levels of risk, unstandardized b = –.89,
SE = .11, p < .001, and also decreased at higher levels
of temptation, b = –.78, SE = .25, p = .005. One-unit in-
creases in risk and temptation corresponded to .89 and .78
unit decreases in the expected value of trust, respectively.
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We used these coefficients to calculate scaled measures of
risk and temptation: EV-risk = .89 * risk; EV-temptation
= .78 * temptation.
The scaled variables, EV-risk and EV-temptation, de-
scribe risk and temptation in terms of their effects on ex-
pected value. Equivalent changes in expected value re-
quire a larger change in temptation, compared to the com-
parable change in risk. This difference is due to the fact
that temptation had a weaker effect on expected value than
risk. Note that a one-unit increase in EV-risk requires a
1.12 unit increase in risk. In contrast, an equivalent change
in EV-temptations requires a larger (1.28 unit) increase in
temptation.
Sensitivity to changes in expected value To test Hy-
pothesis 2, we compared the effects of EV-risk and EV-
temptation on trust. Unlike the previous correlational
analyses, the effects of EV-risk and EV-temptation are now
comparable as decision weights. An optimal decision-
maker should be equally sensitive to changes in EV-risk
and EV-temptation, given that the new variables describe
risk and temptation using the same scale (e.g., units of ex-
pected value). However, if the effect of EV-risk is greater
than that of EV-temptation, this indicates that trust deci-
sions are more sensitive to changes in risk than compara-
ble changes in temptation.
Logistic Generalized Estimating Equations were calcu-
lated using Stata 13. Trust decisions were coded such that
0 = status quo; 1 = trust. Each of 57 participants provided
24 observations (total N = 1368). To account for the clus-
tered nature of the data, an exchangeable working corre-
lation matrix was estimated. EV-risk and EV-temptation
were tested as predictors. Table 2 displays the results.
Risk and temptation both had significant negative effects
on trust. We also tested models to identify main and in-
teractive effects of the Mouselab condition, but found no
significant differences.
Hypothesis 2 states that EV-risk has a larger effect on
trust than EV-temptation, or in other words, |bEV-risk| −
|bEV-temptation| > 0. We used clustered bootstrapping to
estimate the magnitude of this difference (Cheng, Yu, &
Huang, 2013). To account for the multilevel nature of the
data, resampling with replacement occurred at the level
of participants, but not at the level of individual deci-
sions. Five thousand iterations of the logistic model were
estimated. The average difference between |bEV-risk| and
|bEV-temptation| was 1.42 (SE = .59). The 95% confidence
interval of this estimate did not include zero (Table 2), in-
dicating a significance difference in the scaled effects of
risk and temptation, providing support for Hypothesis 2.
Trustors were more sensitive to changes in risk than temp-
tation.
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Table 2: Generalized Estimating Equations were used to calculate the effects of EV-risk and EV-temptation on trust.
Clustered bootstrapping was then used to compare the difference in the effects of EV-risk and EV-temptation.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
b (SE) p b (SE) p
Intercept 1.44 (.17) <.001 1.38 (.17) <.001
EV-risk −3.75 (.28) <.001 −2.27 (.19) <.001







|bEV-risk| − |bEV-temptation| 1.42 (.59) [.24, 2.59] 1.46 (.50) [.49, 2.43]
4 Experiment 2
We conducted Experiment 2 to replicate our analyses com-
paring the effects of risk and temptation on trust, and to
better understand the root cause of trustors’ neglect of
temptation. The idea that decisions to trust are largely ego-
centric implies that trustors do not use the probability of
reciprocity to its full extent. An alternative explanation is
that trustors care about the probability of reciprocity, but
do not recognize the importance of temptation. Instead,
they may infer the probability from generalized expecta-
tions (Rotter, 1967) or other sources of information, such
as group identity (Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009) or
social norms (Bicchieri, Xiao, & Muldoon, 2011; Dun-
ning, Fetchenhauer, & Schlösser, 2012). According to this
view, trustors are misguided, but not necessarily egocen-
tric.
To test this account, Experiment 2 directly measured ex-
pectations of reciprocity. The relatively weak relationship
between trust and temptation in Experiment 1 could be ex-
plained by a disregard for probabilities or ignorance of the
link between temptation and reciprocity. We introduce two
additional hypotheses: Hypothesis 3 states that trustors
understand the relationship between temptation and reci-
procity; Hypothesis 4 states that trustors underweight their
expectations of reciprocity when making decisions.
Experiment 2 was conducted with Amazon’s Mechan-
ical Turk (MTurk; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011).
To simplify the game for online participation, we did not
employ the Mouselab software. Yet, we attempted to repli-
cate key results of Experiment 1, such as the effects of risk
and temptation on trust and reciprocity.
4.1 Method
American participants were recruited from MTurk, N =
155. The average age was 31.4 (SE = .84), 42% were
women, and 97% reported that English was their first lan-
guage. Each participant received 40 cents for completing
the experiment and a bonus payment based on one of their
decisions. Participants were randomly assigned to the role
of trustor (n = 74) or trustee (n = 81).
The experiment consisted of two sections, a replication
of the trust game and a task measuring expectations of
reciprocity. The materials for the trust game from Exper-
iment 1 were adapted for online use (see Appendix). The
instructions were shortened to retain attention and com-
prehension questions were not included. We used the same
set of trials as the previous study (Table 1), but paid par-
ticipants based on only one randomly selected decision.
Typical bonuses ranged from 20–50 cents; the payments
were made one week after the experiment was concluded.
There was no deception.
To avoid priming perspective-taking, we measured ex-
pectations of reciprocity after the trust game. In this part
of the experiment, we asked participants to predict the per-
centage of trustees who would choose to reciprocate trust
in each of the 24 trials. They made predictions using slider
bars that were scaled from 0 to 100. To motivate accurate
predictions, we awarded $1.00 bonuses to the most accu-
rate 10% of participants. These bonuses were delivered
one week later, along with the bonus payments for trust
game decisions.
4.2 Results and discussion
4.2.1 Comparison of lab and MTurk data
Compared with the students recruited in Experiment 1,
MTurk workers were more likely to trust (M = .51, SE =
.030) and reciprocate (M = .50, SE = .032). Although there
were differences in the overall levels of behavior, the ef-
fects of risk and temptation were similar, df’s = 22. Trust
was highly correlated with risk, r = –.91, p < .001, and
weakly correlated with temptation, r = –.38, p = .066. The
rate of reciprocity was strongly correlated with temptation,
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r = –.90, p < .001, and weakly correlated with risk, r = .13,
p = .54.
4.2.2 Sensitivity to risk and temptation
Hypothesis 2 states that trustors underweight the impor-
tance of temptation relative to its effect on the expected
value of trust. In Experiment 1, we found that trustors
were more sensitive to changes in risk than temptation. To
test the robustness of this finding, we replicated our anal-
yses comparing the effects of risk and temptation on trust.
Following the procedure outlined in Experiment 1, we cal-
culated the effects of risk and temptation on the expected
value of trust. Then, we scaled risk and temptation to di-
rectly compare their relative effects on trust decisions.
Using the formula in Experiment 1, we calculated the
expected value for each trial. The overall expected value
of trust was slightly positive, M = .016, SE = .061, and
was positive for 14 out of 24 trials. We used simple linear
regressions to estimate the effects of risk and temptation
on expected value. As in Experiment 1, the expected value
of trust decreased significantly at higher levels of risk, b =
–.89, SE = .15, p < .001, and at higher levels of temptation,
b = –1.05, SE = .24, p < .001. These estimates were then
used to calculate scaled measures of risk and temptation,
EV-risk = .89 * risk; EV-temptation = 1.05 * temptation.
Following the procedure outlined in Experiment 1, we
used logistic GEE to compare the scaled effects of risk
and temptation on trust. Seventy six participants pro-
vided 24 observations each (total N = 1776). The model
summary is reported in Table 2. As in the previous ex-
periment, trustors were significantly influenced by both
risk and temptation. Clustered bootstrapping was then
used to estimate a confidence interval of the difference be-
tween the scaled effects of risk and temptation, |bEV-risk| −
|bEV-temptation|. The average difference was 1.46 (SE = .49).
Because the confidence interval of the estimated differ-
ence did not include zero, we conclude that trustors were
again significantly more sensitive to changes in risk than
comparable changes in temptation.
4.2.3 Risk, temptation, and expectations of reci-
procity
To better understand the weak relationship between temp-
tation and trust, we directly analyzed expectations of reci-
procity. The relative neglect of temptation could have oc-
curred because trustors did not understand the strong ef-
fect of temptation on reciprocity, or they may have un-
derstood this relationship, but underemphasized it when
making a decision.
Participants provided expectations of reciprocity as fre-
quencies (0 to 100), but prior to analyses, expectations
were scaled as proportions (0 to 1). First, we calcu-
lated each participant’s average expectation of reciprocity.
Overall, trustors expected that the probability of reci-
procity was .46 (SE = .020), slightly underestimating the
observed rate of reciprocity, .51, t(73) = 2.37, p = .02. This
replicates the previous finding that trustors are overly cyn-
ical about the likelihood of reciprocity (Fetchenhauer &
Dunning, 2009).
We also examined how trustors used risk and temptation
to form expectations of reciprocity. Hypothesis 3 states
that trustors use temptation to form expectations of reci-
procity. To test this hypothesis, we compared the effect of
temptation on expectations with the actual effect of temp-
tation on the probability of reciprocity.
A linear GEE was used to calculate the effects of risk
and temptation on trustors’ expectations. Trustors ex-
pected less reciprocity at higher levels of temptation, b =
–.52, SE = .024, p < .001, whereas the level of risk had no
significant effect, b = .030, SE = .017, p = .083. Holding
the level of risk constant, a one-unit increase in temptation
was associated with a .52 unit decrease in the expected
probability of reciprocity.
Temptation was indeed an important consideration in
trustors’ expectations of reciprocity, but the previous anal-
ysis did not reveal whether trustors under or overesti-
mated the effect of temptation. To provide a benchmark
for accuracy, we estimated a simple linear regression of
the effect of temptation on the actual probability of reci-
procity, using each trial of the game as an observation, df
= 22. Across trials, increasing temptation significantly de-
creased the probability of reciprocity, b = –.88, SE = .090,
p < .001.
Clustered bootstrapping was then used to compare the
effect of temptation on expectations (b = –.52) with the ac-
tual effect of temptation on the probability of reciprocity
(b = –.88). We estimated 5,000 iterations of the aforemen-
tioned GEE model testing the effects of risk and tempta-
tion on expectations. The average difference was .35 (SE =
.067), with a 95% confidence interval of .23 to .49. Given
that the confidence interval does not include zero, we con-
clude that trustors did not fully account for temptation in
forming expectations of reciprocity. This result could ac-
count, in part, for the relatively weak effect of temptation
on trust decisions. Figure 4 illustrates the effects of temp-
tation on the rates of reciprocity and trustors’ average ex-
pectations. Trustors understood the relevance of tempta-
tion, but underestimated its strength as a predictor of reci-
procity.
4.2.4 Expectations of reciprocity and expected value
Trustors understood, but underestimated, the relationship
between temptation and the probability of reciprocity.
This raises the question of whether they optimally used
expectations when making decisions. Hypothesis 4 states
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Figure 4: The effects of temptation on reciprocity and expectations in Experiment 2.






















































that trustors underweight expectations in their decisions
relative to their effects on expected value. Our approach
to test the effect of expectations on trust was similar to
the previous analyses of risk and temptation. We scaled
trustors’ expectations of reciprocity relative to their effects
on expected value and then compared the scaled effect
of expectations and risk. Note that the expected values
of trust differ for each participant, since each participant
generated distinct estimates for the probabilities of reci-
procity.
We calculated the subjective expected value of trust for
each participant, using each participant’s expectations of
reciprocity (instead of the observed probabilities of reci-
procity). Then we used separate GEE models to estimate
the simple linear effects of risk and expectations on sub-
jective expected value. We found that subjective expected
value increased significantly with higher expectations of
reciprocity, b = .99, p < .001, and decreased at higher lev-
els of risk, b = –1.01, SE = .020, p < .001. These val-
ues were then used to calculate the relative effects of ex-
pectations and risk, SEV-expectations and SEV-risk. In
this case, the scaling procedure had minimal effects on the
measures of risk and expectations.
Our final step was to compare the effects of SEV-
expectations and SEV-risk on trust decisions. A logis-
tic GEE was estimated with trust as the dependent vari-
able and SEV-expectations and SEV-risk entered as pre-
dictors. Trust decreased at higher levels of SEV-risk, b =
–2.09, SE = .17, p < .001, and increased positively with
SEV-expectations, b = .86, SE = .20, p < .001. Clus-
tered bootstrapping was used to compare the effects of risk
and expectations, testing the hypothesis that |bEV-risk| −
|bEV-temptation| > 0. Five thousand iterations of the GEE
were estimated. The average difference in the effects of
risk and expectations was 1.23 (SE = .44), with a 95% con-
fidence interval ranging from .37 to 2.09. The confidence
interval does not include zero, indicating that trustors were
more sensitive to changes in risk than comparable changes
in expectations.
5 General discussion
Dilemmas of trust involve personal risk and expectations
of reciprocity. The prevalent view is that expectations,
rather than risk, are the trustor’s most important consid-
eration. Process tracing methods, which revealed how
trustors searched for information before reaching a de-
cision, supported the opposite conclusion (Experiment
1). Trustors often ignored payoffs related to the trustee’s
temptation. Behaviorally, trustors were also more sensi-
tive to changes in risk than comparable changes in tempta-
tion. Experiment 2, which directly measured expectations
of reciprocity, further investigated the weak relationship
between temptation and trust. Trustors understood, but un-
derestimated, the relationship between temptation and the
probability of reciprocity. However, they did not fully uti-
lize expectations in their decisions. Trust decisions were
more sensitive to changes in risk than expectations, even
after accounting for their differing effects on the subjective
expected value of trust.
Relatively few studies have investigated the structural
aspects of the trust game (Evans & Krueger, 2011; Malho-
tra, 2004; Snijders & Keren, 1999), yet the present results
suggest that changes in risk and temptation have important
consequences for the trustor’s decision-making. Consider,
for example, the question of whether people trust too much
or too little: Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009) found
that trustors, given their stated expectations of reciprocity,
were overly trusting. However, the conclusion suggested
by the present results is that decision-makers, giving insuf-
ficient weight to their expectations, are over-trusting when
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the probability of reciprocity is low and under-trusting
when the probability of reciprocity is high. This pattern
amounts to a regression effect (Fiedler & Krueger, 2012).
Prescriptions for optimal trust decisions need to account
for the levels of risk and temptation.
Risk and temptation also provide insights into how
trustors form expectations of reciprocity. Consistent with
Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009), we found that trustors
tended to underestimate the overall probability of reci-
procity. However, expectations were also influenced by
the level of temptation. Trustors correctly understood
that increases in the other player’s incentives to betray
trust would lead to a decrease in the likelihood of reci-
procity. However, the estimated influence of temptation
was weaker than its actual effect on reciprocity.
The present results are also relevant to the concept
of betrayal-aversion, the finding that decision-makers are
more sensitive to negative outcomes in interpersonal, as
opposed to individual, contexts (Bohnet, Greig, Her-
rmann, & Zeckhauser, 2008). Trustors’ tendency to un-
derweight expectations suggests that betrayal aversion is
related to the cost of betrayal, rather than the probabil-
ity of it occurring. Indeed, trustors are more sensitive to
changes in the losses associated with betrayal, P1 − S,
than gains from reciprocity, R1—P1, (Evans & Krueger,
2011). Note, however, that the present studies did not dif-
ferentiate between these two components of risk.
The evidence of egocentric trust decisions was con-
sistent in the laboratory (Experiment 1) and MTurk (Ex-
periment 2) samples. Interestingly, MTurk workers were
more likely to trust and reciprocate than laboratory partic-
ipants. These behavioral differences may be related to de-
mographic differences and changes in how the trust game
was administered. For example, online participants were
paid for only 1 out of 24 decisions and these bonuses were
delayed one week. Although we cannot speak to the ex-
act source of these differences, we find it reassuring that
the effects of risk and temptation were similar in low- and
high-trust environments.
A limitation of the present studies is that we focused
on one (highly valid) cue to the probability of reciprocity,
temptation. Arguably, trustors are more inclined to rely
on alternative cues to reciprocity, such as group identity
(Foddy et al., 2009) or the trustee’s physical appearance
(Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009) and past behav-
ior (Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002). An important goal for
future research is to understand how trustors utilize dif-
ferent forms of social information, and to examine how
these cues interact with the structural aspects of the situa-
tion. A trustworthy countenance might not only increase
trust (Bonnefon, Hopfensitz, & De Neys, 2013), but also
increase sensitivity to temptation.
The present research suggests that unfavorable out-
comes are the primary barrier to establishing trust among
strangers. Although social psychological models empha-
size the relative importance of expectations, trustors fo-
cused on their own outcomes during information search.
Moreover, trustors did not fully account for their expecta-
tions of reciprocity in their ultimate decisions. Arguably,
if an organization seeks to encourage trust among its mem-
bers, the most direct approach would be to reduce the
trustor’s risk, increasing the benefits of reciprocity and de-
creasing the cost of betrayal. This could be accomplished
by framing the dilemma in a positive light or offering in-
surance in the case of betrayal.
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Appendix
Rates of trust and reciprocity across trials
Six baseline conditions were used to generate a set of 24
distinct trials (see Tables A1 and A2). In both experi-
ments, 100 points = $1.00. In Experiment 1, every deci-
sion was incentivized. In Experiment 2, participants were
paid based on one randomly selected decision.
Experiment 1 Instructions
The instructions to the trust game used in Experiment 1
were presented to participants over 9 pages. To begin,
Pages 1 and 2 introduced the basic structure of the game.
Pages 3-6 familiarized participants with the information
search interface by asking them to retrieve values from the
trust game. Page 7 presented participants with additional
information about their earnings in the experiment. At
Page 8, participants learned their role in the game, Player
1 or 2. Finally, Page 9 presented participants with a series
of comprehension questions to verify that they understood
the procedure.
Page 1
“In the next part of this experiment, you will make several
decisions in an interactive scenario. This scenario involves
two individuals, Player 1 and Player 2. The players will
receive points based on the outcomes of their decisions.
In this scenario, each point is worth $0.01 (players will be
paid at the end of the experiment). First, you will learn the
rules of the scenario, and then you will learn if you were
assigned to the role of Player 1 or Player 2.
In total, the scenario consists of 24 rounds, and each
player will make 24 separate decisions.”
Page 2
[Italicized text was presented to participants in the Mouse-
lab condition]
“Each round of the scenario occurs in two stages: In
the first stage, Player 1 chooses IN or OUT. If Player 1
chooses OUT, the round ends. If Player 1 chooses IN,
then Player 2 chooses KEEP or SHARE. The players earn
different amounts of points based on the outcomes of their
choices.”
Table A1. Baseline conditions of the trust game.
Risk Temptation P1 P2 R1 R2 S T
Low Low 40 20 70 70 30 80
Med 40 20 70 70 30 100
High 40 20 70 70 30 160
High Low 40 20 50 50 10 60
Med 40 20 50 50 10 80
High 40 20 50 50 10 140
[Participants were then presented with an example of
the trust game]
“Note that in each round, Player 1 must choose IN or
OUT without knowing what choice Player 2 will make.
Similarly, Player 2 must choose KEEP or SHARE without
knowing if Player 1 chose IN or OUT. If Player 1 chooses
OUT, it doesn’t matter what choice Player 2 makes. The
potential outcomes of each round will be concealed inside
of boxes. You will need to drag your mouse over these
boxes to learn the values of the outcomes (KEEP, SHARE,
or OUT). For example, in the figure below, if Player 1
chooses OUT, then Player 1 will receive 29 points and
Player 2 will receive 14 points. If Player 1 chooses IN,
then Player 2 will choose KEEP or SHARE. You may only
view the value of one outcome at a time. However, you
may view the outcomes as many times as you wish. On the
following pages, you will be presented with four practice
rounds. The purpose of these practice rounds is to famil-
iarize you with the scenario. You will be asked to respond
to several questions about each round. Please take your
time; it is very important to our research that you fully un-
derstand the rules. Both the values of the outcomes and the
locations of outcomes will change from round to round.”
Pages 3-6
On pages 3-6, participants were presented with four ex-
amples of the trust game and were asked to retrieve infor-
mation about each game’s payoffs. The purpose of these
pages was to familiarize participants with the Mouselab
interface. Participants in the Open-Boxes condition com-
pleted the same task without having to actively search for
information.
Sample question: “Below is an example of one round of
this scenario. Please answer the following questions about
the round before you continue.
If Player 1 chooses OUT. . .
How many points will Player 1 receive?
How many points will Player 2 receive?”
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Table A2. Rates of trust and reciprocity observed in Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment
1, rates of trust and reciprocity are based on combined data from the Mouselab and Open-
Boxes condition (57 trustors and 57 trustees).
Experiment 1 (Lab) Experiment 2 (MTurk)
Risk Temp P1 P2 R1 R2 S T Trust Reciprocity Trust Reciprocity
Low Low 48 25 81 84 36 97 0.51 0.51 0.69 0.72
59 29 107 100 46 125 0.63 0.47 0.59 0.68
44 23 78 76 32 92 0.67 0.42 0.72 0.59
36 18 63 61 28 71 0.54 0.49 0.7 0.67
Med 51 25 91 90 41 125 0.6 0.32 0.69 0.47
55 27 90 94 41 131 0.47 0.19 0.61 0.41
24 12 42 40 19 62 0.53 0.49 0.73 0.59
41 21 67 68 31 98 0.49 0.28 0.61 0.44
High 36 17 64 63 28 147 0.39 0.19 0.54 0.28
28 15 48 49 21 110 0.39 0.16 0.58 0.31
23 12 43 41 18 94 0.53 0.18 0.65 0.32
46 23 88 87 35 200 0.32 0.18 0.65 0.28
High Low 29 14 36 36 7 44 0.25 0.53 0.38 0.78
44 22 54 53 10 65 0.19 0.51 0.43 0.77
19 10 26 26 5 29 0.25 0.58 0.57 0.8
52 25 63 64 13 75 0.12 0.46 0.36 0.65
Med 25 12 31 30 6 48 0.16 0.44 0.39 0.59
28 13 36 36 7 57 0.21 0.47 0.42 0.6
25 12 31 29 6 49 0.18 0.35 0.41 0.52
28 15 37 36 7 59 0.11 0.39 0.38 0.63
High 23 12 29 30 6 87 0.12 0.28 0.42 0.27
42 21 50 48 11 134 0.04 0.3 0.32 0.31
28 14 34 35 7 99 0.09 0.14 0.3 0.28
37 19 45 44 9 120 0.11 0.14 0.28 0.26
Page 7
“Thank you for completing the practice rounds. Now we
will review information about additional earnings in this
scenario. Throughout this scenario, you will earn points
based on the outcomes of your decisions (and the deci-
sions of other players). However, you will not learn these
outcomes until after the experiment is completed. This is
to ensure that all decisions remain anonymous. Every par-
ticipant in this experiment will be assigned to the role of
Player 1 or Player 2. Every time Player 1 makes a de-
cision, he or she will be randomly paired with a person
assigned to the role of Player 2. Every time you make
a decision, you will be paired with a randomly selected
partner. You will be paired with other participants who
are currently completing the experiment. No other par-
ticipants in the experiment will learn about your identity.
Similarly, you will not learn about the identities of any
other participant. Every point you earn is worth one cent.
Your earnings will be paid in cash when you have com-
pleted this experiment. Regardless of how many points
you earn, every participant will also be paid $10 cash at
the end of this session. All earnings in this scenario are in
addition to the $10 cash payment. The number of points
you earn will earn depends upon your decisions, and the
decisions of other participants. We cannot guarantee any
earnings.”
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Page 8
“You have randomly been assigned to the role of Player
1. You will make 24 separate decisions as Player 1, each
time you will be asked to choose IN or OUT. You will be
randomly paired with a different Player 2 each time you
make a decision. The decisions of other players will al-
ways be made by other participants from this experiment.
You will have to make your decisions without learning the
responses of the other players. This means that you will
not know whether each Player 2 chose KEEP or SHARE.
Player 2 will make a choice between KEEP and SHARE
for each round. However, Player 2’s decision will only be
relevant when you choose IN. You will make 24 decisions
as Player 1. Remember, the point values associated with
each outcome (KEEP, SHARE, and OUT) may change in
each round of the scenario. In addition, the locations of
different outcomes may change from round to round.”
Page 9
Concluding the instructions, participants were presented
with a series of multiple choice questions about the ex-
periment. Participants were not permitted to proceed until
they correctly answered each question. When Page 9 was
submitted, incorrect answers were highlighted and partic-
ipants received a hint:
“Before you begin, please answer the following com-
prehension questions. You must answer each question cor-
rectly before you can continue.”
In this scenario, which role were you randomly assigned
to? Player 1 / Player 2
What is the monetary value of 500 points?
$.50 / $1.00 / $5.00 / $10.00
True or false: the decisions of other players will always
be made by other human participants?
True / False
Which of the following statements is true?
You will not learn the other players’ decisions until the
end of the experiment. You will learn the other players’
decisions after each round.
You will learn the identities of the other players.”
Experiment 2 Instructions
To reduce potential fatigue effects, the game instructions
for the MTurk study were reduced from nine to four pages.
Participants learned about the basic structure of the game
and were presented with an example, then learned their
assigned role.
Page 1
“In this part of the experiment, you will make several deci-
sions in an interactive scenario. This scenario involves two
individuals, Player 1 and Player 2. First, you will learn the
rules of the scenario, and then you will learn if you were
assigned to the role of Player 1 or Player 2.
Pay close attention. You will receive a bonus payment
based on one of your decisions.”
Page 2
“The scenario consists of 24 rounds in total, and each par-
ticipant will make 24 separate decisions.
Each round of the scenario occurs in two stages: In
the first stage, Player 1 chooses IN or OUT. If Player 1
chooses OUT, the round ends. If Player 1 chooses IN,
then Player 2 chooses SHRAE or KEEP.
Note that in each round, Player 1 chooses IN or OUT
without knowing what choice Player 2 will make. Simi-
larly, Player 2 chooses SHARE or KEEP without knowing
if Player 1 chose IN or OUT. If Player 1 chooses OUT, it
doesn’t matter what choice Player 2 makes.
Below is an example of one round of the game.
[EXAMPLE OF GAME]”
Page 3
“You will receive a bonus payment based on one of your
decisions in this scenario. This payment is in addition to
your 40 cent payment for completing the HIT.
One week after the experiment is completed, we will
choose one round from this scenario and randomly assign
partners. You will receive a bonus payment based on your
decision and the decision of your partner.
Please make your decisions carefully.”
Page 4
“You have randomly been assigned to the role of Player 1.
You will make 24 separate decisions as Player 1, each time
you will be asked to choose IN or OUT. You will be ran-
domly paired with a different Player 2 each time you make
a decision. The decisions of other players will always be
made by other participants from this experiment.
You will have to make your decisions without learn-
ing the responses of the other players. This means that
you will not know whether each Player 2 chose KEEP or
SHARE. Player 2 will make a choice between KEEP and
SHARE for each round. However, Player 2’s decision will
only be relevant when you choose IN.
You will make 24 decisions as Player 1. Remember, the
values associated with each outcome (SHARE, KEEP, and
OUT) will change in each round of the scenario.
Remember, you will receive a bonus payment based on
one of your decisions.”
